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This paper focuses on the determinants of financial inter vivos transfers by migrants 
living in France in 2003 to their adult children. From a theoretical viewpoint, such 
transfers may be explained either by altruism or by exchange. While parents would direct 
their assistance to their less well off children under altruism, support should be channeled 
to children who live nearby their parents under the exchange motive. We assess the 
relevance of these two motives using the French PRI survey. Unequal sharing is 
frequently observed and children are more likely to receive financial transfers when they 
are in poor circumstance, but not necessarily when living in proximity to parents. We 
also emphasize the role of cultural factors as determinants of the parental allocation 
among children. Muslim parents, in particular, are more likely to make transfers to sons 
than to daughters. 
Keywords: altruism, exchange, inter vivos transfers, unequal sharing 




 This paper examines how family resources are redistributed across generations by 
investigating parental motives in the transfer process. Drawing on a sample of foreign-born parents 
living in France and focusing on inter vivos cash gifts made to adult children, we give particular 
attention to cultural factors, especially country of origin and religion, as determinants of the 
allocation among children. Understanding the motives for private transfers has long been a matter 
of concern among economists as it relates to the effectiveness of public transfer programs. 
Since inter vivos transfers have a strong impact on the attainments and living standards of 
adult children1, it is important to understand how parents make transfer decisions and especially 
how they decide on allocations among children when there are several offspring. Do parents make 
allocation decisions, for example, with the intention of reducing inequality among offspring 
(favoring a needy child) or is more given to the child who can most productively use the additional 
resources? Parents might make transfer decisions with their own welfare in mind or might follow 
cultural norms in their distributions, possibly giving larger sums to male offspring or to a first born 
child. Injunctions fostering the latter sorts of allocations, especially in regard to bequests, are found 
in the biblical texts of many faiths2 and might well guide parental behavior in traditional settings 
with respect to inter vivos transfers as well. 
The issue of transfer allocations among children has received considerable attention by 
economists. The parental motives literature mainly focuses on altruism versus exchange as 
competing models (see Laferrère and Wolff, 2006). In essence, altruistic parents care about 
offspring and provide financial support to enhance their well-being. Under an exchange motive, 
parents make financial transfers in return for services provided by children or to indebt the 
children to provide services at a later time point (Cox, 1987). Exchange models are largely neutral 
in their consequences for the replication of inequality, while altruistic motives can reduce the 
effectiveness of government transfer programs because of the potential for “crowding out” private 
family assistance (Cox and Jakubson, 1995, Schoeni, 2002). 
The considerable empirical research on altruism versus exchange motives has yielded 
conflicting assessments. Much of the existing literature is characterized by an assumption that one 
or the other of the presumed motives describes the decision making of all parents, though a few 
studies have sought to associate their conclusions with a particular country, recognizing the 
possible impact of cultural norms and local institutional arrangements (Hayashi, 1995, Lucas and 
Stark, 1985, Spilerman and Elmelech, 2003). To the best of our knowledge, no study has sought 
to ascertain whether multiple motives might be operative within a country and whether different 
parental designs should be associated with particular population groups in a society3. 
The intent of our contribution is to assess the relevance of the altruistic and exchange 
models using a unique data set from France that permits both a test of the applicability of one or 
the other of the motives to the full population under consideration, as well as an exploration of 
                                                 
1 Some important studies of the effects of parental transfers are Mayer and Engelhard (1996) on the waiting time to 
homeownership, Spilerman (2004) on the living standards of young couples, and Lindh and Ohlsson (1998) on the 
rate of entry into self-employment and entrepreneurship. 
 
2 The rules of inheritance in the Old Testament are outlined in Numbers 27:1-11, and Deuteronomy 21:17. In 
particular, a daughter can inherit only if there is no male heir. Also, the eldest son receives a double share. Christian 
practice has been more diverse, in some places following the biblical rule while in other European lands primogeniture 
was the norm. Islamic law is more complex in regard to inheritances, with detailed prescriptions for different 
categories of inheritors; also, in practice, inheritance patterns often differ between Suni and Shi’i adherents. In a 
situation in which there is a daughter and son as survivors, the son inherits a 2/3 share, the daughter a 1/3 share 
(Radford, 2000). 
 
3 Laitner (1997, p. 234), in a theoretical analysis, does note that “in practice, the two [motives] may often accompany 
one another, with altruism reducing enforcement difficulties in interfamily exchanges”. Also see the discussion in Light 
and McGarry (2004) who focus on the planned division of estates.  
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whether the transfer pattern differs by cultural group. The data set we use is entitled “Passage à la 
Retraite des Immigrés” (PRI hereafter), collected in 2002-2003, which surveyed immigrants to 
France regarding their financial situation, family relationships, and transfer histories (both to 
relatives living in France and remittances to the origin countries).  
Although the data are cross-sectional, they offer several interesting features when focusing 
on the motives for private transfers to children. First, there are questions about the provision of 
transfers made during the last five years, with parents indicating whether or not they have helped 
each of their children. Second, parents provide information on the main characteristics of their 
children. This permits a reduction in measurement error, assuming the response bias is similar for 
all children in a family, as well as an opportunity to control for unobserved heterogeneity using 
random and fixed effects models. Although the income level of the children is unknown, the 
survey includes a measure of each child’s financial circumstance. Third, the sample consists of 
respondents who are heterogeneous in background, in that the migrants mainly come from 
Southern Europe or from North African countries, with different religions and cultural traditions.  
Combining these various facets of the data permit estimates that take into account 
unobserved heterogeneity at the family level, and enable a consideration of the role of cultural 
factors. Our main results are that transfers from migrants are mainly altruistically motivated, but 
that they are heavily influenced by the donor’s religion and culture. We develop these themes in 
the following sections. In section 2, we briefly summarize the parental motives literature. Section 3 
provides a description of the data and of the transfer patterns. Results from our econometric 
analysis pertaining to parental motive are reported in section 4, and the role of cultural factors in 
the transmission process is addressed in section 5. 
 
2. Motives for private transfers: A brief review 
 Economists have suggested two main hypotheses to explain the motives behind private 
transfers, i.e. altruism and exchange (Laitner, 1997, Laferrère and Wolff, 2006).  
 Let us first consider the altruistic scenario, according to which parents care about their 
children’s situation (Becker, 1974). Assuming that parental income is sufficiently high to permit 
the transfer of financial resources, parents maximize a weighted sum of their own level of 
satisfaction and their children’s levels of satisfaction. Transfers are then a means to redistribute 
money across generations and among siblings. When parents help their children, individual levels 
of consumption (either of the parent or the children) do not depend on the distribution among 
the various family members. This income pooling property is the basis of the well-known Rotten 
Kid theorem (Becker, 1974). 
 In an altruistic setting, parents will increase the transfer amount when their own income 
has grown. Despite the loss in their private consumption, parents will be more than compensated 
by the rise in the children’s well-being. Conversely, for a child, the amount of transfer received is 
lower when the child is richer. Parents are also expected to favor those children who are in a poor 
situation relative to their siblings. Consider, for example, a sibship with two children, a rich one 
and a poor one. If the rich child receives extra revenue, parents will reduce the gift value made to 
the rich child. The additional amount of “saved” resources may then be transferred to the other, 
poorer child. So, the shape of parental transfers fully depends on the distribution of incomes 
between the various family members4. 
  Unequal transfers between siblings are expected under altruism. Nevertheless, equal sharing 
could be observed in the particular case where children are characterized by differentiated 
revenues, but parents are more altruistic towards a child who, say, “performs better” in some arena 
                                                 
4 A redistribution of resources between the parent and one child leads to a perfect adjustment in the transfer value, 
family income being held constant (see the discussion in Altonji et al, 1997). 
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of interest to the parent. Other explanations may be invoked for equal sharing within the family. 
Wilhelm (1996) argues that parents may suffer a psychic cost if they deviate from an equal 
allocation of resources. Stark (1998) suggests that a child who receives less than his or her siblings 
may feel under-appreciated, so that parents perceive emotional costs to treating their children 
differently. 
 The exchange motive involves some reciprocity between generations. Cox (1987) and Cox 
and Rank (1992) claim that financial gifts made by parents constitute payment for services and 
visits provided by children. Another mechanism is the familial loan model, where parents lend 
money for consumption, to be repaid in the future with a presumably above-market interest rate 
(Cox, 1990). In contrast with the altruistic model, the relationship between the amount of transfer 
received and the child’s income may be either positive or negative, depending on the elasticities of 
supply and demand for time-related resources. As a child becomes richer, parents have to pay a 
higher price if they want to obtain the same amount of services from that child, but they may also 
purchase a lower level of attention5. 
 The exchange model leads to other interesting consequences. First, money-service 
exchanges are likely to generate an unequal division of transfers within the family. As pointed out 
in Cox (1996, p. 84), some children may have a comparative advantage to specialize in the 
provision of time-related resources. This would be the case, for instance, for children who do not 
have a paid job or who live in shared residence arrangements or nearby their parents. Second, a 
positive relationship between the measure of services and the financial transfer is expected (Cox 
and Rank, 1992). Nonetheless, such a pattern may also be consistent with two-sided altruism as in 
Becker and Murphy (1988). 
 Testing the relevance of the altruistic and exchange models should then be conducted at an 
intra-household level, with an emphasis on the allocation of private financial transfers among 
siblings. Surprisingly, many empirical analyses investigate transfers that are received by only one 
focal child in a family. This approach is certainly less data demanding, but it conveys much less 
information about the parental intent. A few papers have examined how parents divide their 
resources among children. These studies all reach a similar conclusion for inter vivos transfers, 
namely that poor children are more likely to be helped by their parents. 
 Drawing on the Health and Retirement Survey and using fixed effects models, McGarry 
and Schoeni (1995) find that respondents give greater financial assistance to less well off children 
than to offspring with higher incomes. In a second study (McGarry and Schoeni 1997) they also 
conclude that transfers mainly benefit poorer children within a family, and they reject the thesis 
that parents provide financial help in exchange for caregiving. Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2003) 
report that only 5% of parents in the US who give money to their children divide the gifts equally 
among the offspring. There is also evidence that parents use inter vivos gifts to smooth the income 
of their children, providing assistance at times when the child’s resources are below his or her 
permanent income (Dunn, 1997, Dunn and Phillips, 1997). 
 In France, there has not been an empirical investigation of the intra-household allocation 
of parental resources. We attempt to fill this gap by examining a new survey of migrants living in 
France which contains detailed information on inter vivos transfers between parents and offspring. 
While our results are not representative of the full French population, an analysis of migrants 
relates to the behaviors of a growing segment of the population in this country, as well as in much 
of Western Europe. Further, because of the diverse backgrounds of the respondents we are able to 
inquire about the residual impact of origin country and culture, which may well influence intra-
household transfer decisions. 
 
                                                 
5 If there exist only poor substitutes for the child’s attention (Cox, 1996), then the relationship between the child’s 
level of resources and the amount transferred by the parent should be positive. 
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 3.1. The PRI Survey 
 The ‘Passage à la Retraite des Immigrés’, used in the empirical analysis, is a cross-sectional 
data set collected in France between December 2002 and March 2003 by the Caisse Nationale 
d’Assurance Vieillesse, in collaboration with the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques. The primary focus of the survey was to provide an accurate description of the way-
of-life of migrants currently living in France, especially with respect to migration history and their 
retirement and location expectations6. 
With the aging of migrants, it is important for policy makers to know whether they intend 
to stay in France or return to their origin countries. As the aim of the survey is to better 
understand their retirement decisions, the sample comprises 6211 individuals between 45 and 70 
years of age7. Each respondent was asked not only about his or her own situation, but also about 
the characteristics of other family members. A central feature of the survey is that it contains 
information on transfers given to all children and, hence, permits an examination of the intra-
household distribution of financial assistance. Furthermore, given the life-cycle stage of the 
migrants, most of their children are adults, many at points in which they have substantial financial 
needs (such as for the purchase of housing or to start a family). 
In this paper, we restrict attention to financial transfers given by parents to their children. 
Our primary focus is not one of understanding how intergenerational transfers flow within 
foreign-born families, whether upwards or downwards (see Attias-Donfut et al, 2006b), but one of 
investigating the intra-household allocation of parental assistance. The parent is the respondent in 
the survey. For each respondent, information was collected on gender, age, matrimonial status 
(living as a couple or not), numbers of children at home and elsewhere, years of education, self-
reported health status, occupational situation, household income, and religion. The survey also 
includes a description of the migration history of the respondent: origin country, duration in 
France, and whether or not French citizenship is held. 
Concerning the children’s characteristics, information was collected from the parent about 
each child, whether living in the parental home or elsewhere. This is an important feature of our 
data, since it permits some insight into parental allocation preferences. For each child, we have 
information on gender, age, citizenship, distance from the parental home, and contacts and visits 
with parents. In addition, for offspring older than 16, there are questions about the child’s 
economic situation. Although we lack data about the child’s income, the survey provides several 
variables by which we can proxy household income and material need. 
In addition to educational attainment, we know whether the child is currently a student, 
unemployed, otherwise not in the labor force, or employed. For the last category, we have 
information about whether the job is performed in the private sector, in the public sector, or as 
self-employment. There is also a subjective question concerning the child’s level of financial well-
being, given by an ordinal scale (ranging from ‘very poor’ to ‘financially very comfortable’). This 
subjective information is a-priori strongly correlated with the child’s level of income, though there 
may be measurement error and endogeneity concerns as a result of a self-serving response bias. 
These issues are addressed in the empirical analysis. 
                                                 
6 For a detailed description of the survey, see Attias-Donfut et al (2006b). While the data are not yet in the public 
domain, an English language version of the questionnaire can be obtained from the authors. 
 
7 When designing the sample, exactly 12,010 migrant households living in France were randomly selected from the 
Census. The questionnaire was completed for 7,433 households, while there was no answer in 4,577 cases (refusal, 
impossible to contact, absent, etc). Finally, 1,222 cases were dropped from the sample, because the respondent did not 
meet either the age or the migrant criterion. Thus, 6,211 questionnaires are available to researchers. The questionnaire 
required approximately one hour to administer.  
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We now describe the sample selected for the study. First, trivially, we restrict attention to 
parents having children. Second, we only focus on adult children. These offspring are defined as 
being at least 20 years old at the time of the survey. Third, we account for children residing either 
in France or in the origin country. Fourth, we delete the few cases (N=95) with missing data on 
either parental or children’s characteristics. Finally, since we want to investigate transfer decisions 
at the family level, we construct a new sample where each child is counted as one observation. 
Thus, a parent who has three adult children will contribute three observations to the new sample. 
Owing to the various selections, the sample we constructed contains 13,762 child-parent 
pairs, corresponding to 4,999 families8. The key feature of this sample is that it provides 
information on how parental characteristics influence the decision to assist adult offspring. With 
these data we can assess the possible tendency by parents to provide more assistance to a child with 
particular characteristics. However, the children from the same parental household are not 
independent observations; as a consequence, an appropriate correction method using panel data 
techniques is needed when performing regressions. 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Referring, at this point, to the total sample 
(column 7), the mean age of the parents is 58 years, and 83.5% of them are living with a partner. 
They have completed 6 years of education on average, and 47.4% are home owners. Concerning 
migration history, the mean number of years in France is around 34. Approximately one-third 
hold French citizenship and 50.1% have difficulty with reading French. There are significant 
differences in cultural background. Some 42% come from Europe and 47.5% from Africa. 
Moreover, these continent groupings are concentrated in a few countries, with six nationalities 
representing around 75% of observations. Among European migrants, 34.3% are from Portugal, 
Italy and Spain; among African migrants, 42.8% come from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Regarding the children, 49.1% are girls and the mean age of the children is 30 years. They 
have more schooling than their parents, with 11 years of completed study, versus a parental 
average of 6 years. We note that 64.7% of the children are employed, 12% are students, and 10% 
are unemployed. Parents most often consider their children to be in a fair economic situation 
(54.2%), but 17.3% are viewed as financially poor by their parents9. Finally, while only 12% of 
the children live outside France, much of the cross-generation monetary flow returns to the origin 
country. In this respect, the latter transfers are closely related to remittances. Given these data 
features, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of heterogeneity, both between and 
within families, owing to the effects of location and cultural tastes.  
 
 3.2. The pattern of financial transfers 
The exact question in the survey concerning private transfers is: “During the past five 
years, have you provided money, either regularly or occasionally, to family members or friends?” If 
yes, the respondent is asked to provide detailed information about each transfer. Importantly, at 
most four transfers are recorded in the survey. When some money is given to a child, we know 
which child received the assistance. Also, for each gift, there is information about the parental 
motive. The respondent had to choose between several alternatives, like helping the child because 
                                                 
8 Among the 6,211 respondents, exactly 430 have no children and were excluded from the sample. From the 
remaining families we obtain 19,285 children. Since we focus on children aged 20 and older, our final sample 
comprises 13,762 parent-child pairs. 
 
9 Where parents were not aware of the financial circumstance of a child, the response ‘unknown’ was coded in the 
survey. Since the number of ‘unknown’s was relatively few, in the analysis these children were included in the 
intermediate ‘fair’ category, where they comprise less than 5% of observations in this category. To examine the 
robustness of the results, we also constructed a variable with four categories for the child’s financial situation (poor, 
fair, rich, and unknown). The estimates are very similar with the two definitions of the child’s economic circumstance. 
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of financial problems, buying a dwelling, because of a family event (e.g., marriage, birth, 
communion), etc. This information can be helpful in discriminating between altruism and 
exchange10. Finally, we have information on the value of the gift. 
 A difficulty, however, is that the gift amount received by a child is coded in eleven 
categories. One strategy that can be used with such data is to estimate interval-level models, which 
allow for an observation to be either point, interval, left-censored or right-censored. A second 
approach is to construct a continuous distribution from the categorical data, making use of the 
information about interval sizes and coding each cell by its midpoint. Normally, there is a question 
about the value to be assigned to the highest category, which is open-ended. However, in the 
present survey, there were no respondents in this category, which is receipt of a transfer greater 
than 90,000 euros, or even in the immediately preceding category (60,000 to 90,000 euros) 11. 
Using this approximation we obtain a mean value of 2727 euros per transfer, with a 
standard deviation of 5848 euros. There is, however, a problem with this approach when the 
income variable is used as a dependent variable in a regression model, namely, the error 
distribution cannot be assumed to be normal because the measurement error in the dependent 
variable is non-normal12. We therefore also use a third approach, which draws on the method of 
simulated residuals described in Gouriéroux et al (1987). In this formulation, one constructs a 
continuous distribution from information on a categorical variable by inferring from a regression 
model a predicted value for the outcome and then adding a random term. For each observation, 
the ‘augmented’ predicted value (in the sense that it includes a random component) has to match 
the original category.  
We applied this technique to the categorical information so that, for each positive transfer, 
a continuous value was obtained which consistently matches its original interval.13 The mean 
transfer value with the method of simulated residuals is 2613 euros, quite close to the estimate of 
2727 given by the midpoint approximation, and the standard deviation is almost identical under 
the two estimation procedures (5808 euros with the simulated estimates). In modeling the transfer 
receipts, we employ all three approaches (interval, midpoint, simulated) to assess whether the 
substantive results are sensitive to the definition of the dependent variable.  
Several points should be noted concerning the measurement of private transfers with the 
PRI data. First, transfer information was collected only for the last five years. This can be 
problematic since the transfer probability is clearly a function of the time interval referenced in the 
question. A longer period would surely have produced more transfers. Thus, the available data do 
not permit a comprehensive description of transfers over the full life course14. Offsetting this loss is 
the ability to better link the provision of transfers to the current situation of the recipient. 
Transfers that were made many years earlier cannot be easily associated with present levels of need. 
Past gifts may also have influenced the child’s current financial status, which can lead to a causality 
issue. 
                                                 
10 However, such data must be used with caution. A parent who decides to help a needy child is certainly motivated by 
altruistic feelings, but a transfer related to housing or school expenditures conveys little information about an altruistic 
or exchange intent. 
 
11 The distribution of gift amounts is quite skewed. Some 36% of observations fall in the lowest transfer category (less 
than 360 euros); 18% in the next lowest category (380-760 euros). From that point the fall off is roughly exponential, 
with 3% of observations in category 9 (15,000 to 30,000 euros), the highest category containing 0 observations. 
 
12 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this out. 
 
13 We compute a continuous value once for each financial transfer. This generates a continuous distribution of the 
transfer amounts which is then used in the various regressions. 
 
14 Because of recall problems, the tendency to inquire about transfers during a limited time interval is common to 
many large scale surveys. Thus, the National Survey of Families and Households inquires about transfers during the 
prior five years, while the Health and Retirement Study asks about transfers in the preceding 12 months. 
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Another problem is that at most four recipients are recorded in the survey. However some 
families with more than four children are included in the regression analysis. This could produce 
an overestimate of the frequency of equal transfers (that is, assistance provided to all children) were 
an omitted child to not have received a transfer. Fortunately, there are very few families in the PRI 
survey who report gifts to as many as four recipients over the five year period (a frequency of less 
than 1%). As a consequence, the PRI survey, with its detailed description of the parent and with 
information about each potential recipient, is well suited for investigating the matter of the intra-
family allocation of transfers. 
As reported in Table 1, some 9.2% of children were helped by their parents during the five 
years preceding the survey, a transfer rate that is low in comparison with comparable studies (e.g., 
McGarry and Schoeni [1995, p. S188] report a receipt rate of 13.8% in the prior 12 months in 
the Health and Retirement Survey). While the transfer rate in the PRI study may appear low, and 
the transfer amounts are small since the (simulated) mean value is 2613 euros for each receiving 
child, one has to keep in mind that migrants living in France have little in the way of financial 
resources with which to help their offspring. Further, the migrants have other family members, 
besides children, residing in the origin country and part of the migrant's resources is transmitted to 
these relatives in the form of remittances. As to the distribution of the transfer amounts, the 
disparities are huge since the (simulated) median is 688 euros while the mean is equal to 2613 
euros. Clearly, most transfers involve small monetary sums, though a few are large enough to be 
viewed as serious transmissions of parental wealth.  
Table 2 provides details about how the transfer stream varies by origin location and 
religion. The frequency of receipt, as well as transfer amount, is much higher for children of 
migrants from Europe and America than from the other continents. The probability for a child 
being helped is equal to 13.6% for European-origin families, but only 5.3% for families from 
Africa. Even within Europe, there exists a gap between northern and southern countries. The 
transfer rate is more than twice as high in the former. In part, origin country is a proxy for the 
level of household resources. Migration from southern countries is linked to job intentions, 
especially for low-skilled workers, while migration from northern countries is more often 
associated with reasonably well-off households seeking a better location for retirement. Another 
consideration relates to family size, which tends to be larger for North African migrants and which 
may reduce the likelihood of a transfer receipt by any one child. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Similar results are found with respect to the religion categories. We created six dummy 
variables, covering Catholic, Muslim, Protestant (including Evangeliste and Anglican), other 
Christian (Orthodox, Gregorian, Maronite, other Christian Armenian), no religion, and a residual 
“other” category which includes respondents who did not report a religious affiliation. Again, we 
find sizeable disparities, which can be associated with Northern and Southern countries. The 
probability for a child to be helped is 12.8% when the parent is Catholic, but only 4.3% when the 
parent is Muslim. These differences possibly reflect income disparities (Muslims immigrants come 
predominantly from North Africa and tend to be poorer) or cultural norms regarding 
intergenerational support, which, in Muslim countries, could be more oriented toward assisting 
elders.  
A consideration of the reasons conveyed by the parent for making a transfer, reported for 
the full sample in column (1) of Table 3, may be helpful in determining the transfer motive, 
although the responses must be examined with caution. It is possible that parents declare 
themselves as more altruistic than they are in daily life. When examining the primary reason stated 
by the donor, we find 42.9% of the gifts are directed to help children because of financial 
problems. As noted, this is not surprising since most of the children receive transfers of limited 
value, too small to assist with the purchase of expensive items such as a home.  
Insert Table 3 here 
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The fact that parents help children when they are needy is consistent with some altruistic 
motives. Yet, a benevolent motive is insufficient for explaining what happens in the migrant 
population. Indeed, the data suggest that several motives may be operative. On the one hand, 
13.8% of parents helped their children to buy a dwelling and 6.9% are concerned with non-
housing expenditures. On the other hand, 8.6% of the gifts have been made in response to ‘happy’ 
family events, and 15.9% of parents simply state a desire to make a gift. Clearly, the latter sorts of 
transfers are not associated with poor financial circumstances on the part of children. Beyond this 
account, there are substantial differences in motive by religion (columns (2) and (3)), a theme that 
we explore later in the paper. 
Concluding our overview of parental decision making among migrants, we present 
summary statistics in Table 4 on the intra-family allocation of transfers, which will be particularly 
relevant to our consideration of cultural factors in the transmission process. Because of the 
questionnaire design, noted earlier, this sample is restricted to families with four or fewer children. 
Also, one child families are omitted from the calculation of equal/unequal transfers because there is 
no allocation decision to be made. The sample for the subsequent regression analysis of unequal 
versus equal allocation is therefore reduced to 3,149 families. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Consider the magnitude of unequal sharing and, for the moment, examine only the top 
panel, referring to the total population. On average, some money is received by all the children, 
our definition of equal sharing, in 7.9% of cases (column 4) while the proportion of families in 
which at least one child, but not all, obtained parental assistance is 9.8%. Hence, among families 
that received assistance, the frequency of unequal sharing is 55.4%, a figure only slightly below the 
reports of others (e.g., Wilhelm 1996, though with respect to bequests). Not unexpectedly, the 
odds of unequal sharing increases sharply with family size (column 5). 
We emphasize that our characterization of “equal” and “unequal” sharing is based on 
transfer probabilities, not on amounts transmitted, and is therefore an approximation to the true 
figures. The frequency of unequal sharing is overstated because of the different ages of children in 
a family and the limitation of the observation period to the last five years. Any transfer made 
outside this time interval is not visible to us. On the other hand, the rate of unequal transfers may 
be understated because we make no reference to amounts, only to whether a transfer was received 
by a child15.  
 
4. Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of Transfers 
To understand transfer decisions within the migrant population, we undertake an 
econometric analysis using the matched child-parent sample. The dependent variable is a dummy 
term which is equal to one when some money is received by a given child. The regressors are the 
usual human capital and demographic characteristics of the parent plus terms for health status, 
household income, homeownership, and three variables that relate to the migration trajectory of 
the respondent (duration in France, whether or not French citizenship is held, and whether the 
migrant experiences problems in reading French). To capture possible cultural effects, we 
introduce a dummy term for the Muslim religion. We also introduce a set of variables that tap 
characteristics of the child. 
As we have repeated information on children for many of the families, standard regressions 
such as Probit models will produce biased estimates. As pointed out by McGarry and Schoeni 
(1995), unobserved factors associated with transfers, such as the extent of parental altruism or the 
taste for redistributing resources, tend to be correlated among siblings. We therefore account for 
                                                 
15 We also constructed an alternate definition for equal transfers, based on amounts in the range of 0.9 to 1.1 of the 
average for the sibship during the preceding five years. The multivariate results are quite similar under the two 
definitions.  
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family unobserved heterogeneity through the use of panel data techniques. Either a random or 
fixed effect formulation permits the potential bias induced by the presence of unobserved parental 
characteristics to be controlled for, and we consider both formulations in order to assess the 
sensitivity of the results to method. We begin by estimating a random effects Probit model. With 
this specification, it is assumed that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved 
parental effects.  
The results are reported in column 1 of Table 5. Regarding the consequence of parental 
characteristics, the probability of a child receiving assistance increases with parental age until 56.4 
years and then declines, possibly a consequence of the greater need for funds as retirement is 
approached. We also observe a fall off in the probability of receipt as a function of the number of 
children in the parental household, irrespective of whether they live at home or elsewhere. This 
suggests a process of competition for parental resources--the more siblings, the lower the 
probability of receiving assistance. Not surprisingly, the gift rate is a positive function of 
education, income, and homeownership, as each of these terms taps the financial status of the 
parent. We also find evidence of an acculturation effect, in that difficulty with reading French by 
the parental respondent, net of controls for human capital and other parental resources, reduces 
the likelihood of receipt by a child, a suggestion of the continued impact of country of origin and 
the norms thereof among the less integrated migrants. Similarly, there is an indication of a 
religious predisposition, in that the transfer rate is lower among Muslim respondents, though this 
result is only marginally significant. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Characteristics of the child also contribute to the receipt incidence. Indeed, an assumption 
of insignificance of the child’s covariates in the Probit equation is rejected by a Wald test; clearly, 
parents take into account the needs of their children in making transfer decisions16. The likelihood 
of receipt of assistance is an increasing function of a child’s age until 36 years; beyond this point 
assistance from parents becomes less frequent. It is hardly surprising that parents target transfers to 
younger offspring who, presumably, are coping with the costs of starting a household or with 
childrearing. A result of some interest relates to gender: female children are substantially less likely 
to receive transfers than their brothers. Interestingly, this result departs from studies in the United 
States (e.g., McGarry and Schoeni, 1995). 
The direct measures of the economic circumstance of a child provide the clearest insight 
into how parents make transfer decisions. The child’s economic situation is proxied by a set of 
variables: education, occupation, and a subjective measure of financial need that was reported by 
the parent. While the education variable is not significant, both occupational status and the 
financial terms provide consistent results: assistance is more likely to be received by a child who is a 
student or otherwise not in the labor force, in contrast with one who is employed. Further, 
parental aid is more frequent if a child is in fair or poor financial circumstance, rather than “rich”. 
Migrants to France, clearly, target their less well-off children for transfers17. 
To investigate the sensitivity of the results to our correction for unobserved heterogeneity, 
we utilize the conditional (fixed effects) Logit approach described by Chamberlain (1980). The 
sample is now restricted to families in which at least one child but not all received a transfer. 
Parental characteristics are not introduced since they do not vary among the children of a given 
sibship18. With this restriction the number of observations is reduced to 1,449. Estimates for this 
                                                 
16 This suggests that in the migrant population we can reject the hypothesis that transfers from parents are explained 
by some kind of warm-glow process, according to which parents derive egoistical pleasure from the act of giving. 
 
17Cox (1990) suggests that the negative relationship between the probability of transfer receipt and the recipient’s 
economic situation may be a consequence of liquidity constraints.  
 
18 Both observed and unobserved parental characteristics are, of course, picked up by the family fixed effects. 
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fixed effects model are reported in column 2, and show results that are consistent with the random 
effects specification. We find, again, that children not in the labor force, and offspring in fair or 
poor financial circumstance, are more likely to obtain assistance. Again, we note that the likelihood 
of receipt increases with distance from the parental home and that female children are less likely to 
receive support. 
A related matter concerns the reliability of the parent’s assessment of a child’s financial 
situation. This could raise an endogeneity issue in that parents might report a child to whom a 
transfer has just been given to be in poor financial circumstance, i.e. essentially an attempt by the 
parent to achieve cognitive consistency19. However, the parent is the source of information about 
all the children in a household. We therefore assume that measurement error contained in the 
parental report is the same for all the offspring, in which case much of the bias would be removed 
in the fixed effects formulation20.  However, this condition is unlikely to hold to the extent that the 
measurement error depends on the amount of time elapsed since the transfer was given, or on the 
amount of the transfer. 
We attempt to explain the transfer amount received by a child using a Tobit model with a 
random effects specification to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the family level (columns 3 
and 4 of Table 5). We estimated the model twice, once with the amount given by the midpoints of 
the receipt categories, and a second time with the simulated transfer distribution. We obtain 
similar results from the two formulations, suggesting that our findings are robust to the coding of 
the dependent variable. As in the analysis of the incidence of receipt, we conclude that financially 
well to do parents provide more funds to their children, that a smaller sibship size means a larger 
transmission, that lack of acculturation (difficulty with reading French) reduces the transfer 
amount, and that smaller sums are received by children of Muslim migrants. Similarly, in regard to 
the children's characteristics, we find a preference in the amount transferred for offspring who are 
in fair or poor circumstance, who live in the origin country or in France but at a distance from the 
parent, and who are male; in short, findings that are analogous to the determinants of transfer 
incidence.  
To further assess the sensitivity of the results to the coding of the dependent variable, the 
preceding analysis was replicated using an interval regression model with the zero values treated as 
point data and the positive amounts as interval data. The estimates from this specification (column 
5) are quite similar to those of the Tobit regressions. There are a few differences with the children’s 
covariates, especially “female” and “not in labor force” which are now insignificant; however, the 
parental transfers clearly remain targeted towards the poorer children.  
To summarize, this analysis of migrants to France suggests that parents are more likely to 
help their poorer children, a finding that is consistent with both an altruistic and an exchange 
motive. A further finding, however, supports altruism. The exchange motive is based on a notion 
of reciprocity, such as transfers given to a child in return for assistance to parents in the form of 
visits and other services. Such a process would suggest more frequent or larger transfers to children 
who live in proximity to parents and, consequently, are in a better position to provide services. In 
this regard, the findings in Table 5 consistently indicate a positive effect of distance within France 
                                                 
19 We stress that the same problem pervades many studies of the distribution of private transfers within the family. In 
many questionnaires, the parent is asked about the financial situation of the children. Even when the parent chooses 
among different income categories, the parent may be tempted to understate the true income of a child if a transfer has 
just been given to the child. 
 
20We re-estimated the various models excluding the parental measure of the child’s financial situation in order to assess 
the extent of change in the coefficients of the more objective measures of financial need. The findings, not reported 
here, show that the preference for less well-off children is a robust finding. Indeed, with the fixed-effect Logit 
specification, the probability of a child receiving a transfer is higher when the child is a student or otherwise not in the 
labor force. Also, the coefficient attached to the unemployment term becomes significant at the one-percent level, 
though it barely reaches significance in the regressions in Table 5, which include the parental subjective estimate of 
child’s financial status.  
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on both transfer frequency and amount, and a higher rate of transfers to children living outside of 
France, findings that are inconsistent with an exchange motive. 
 
5. Cultural influences on the parental allocation 
 Migrants bring with them a cultural heritage regarding appropriate family arrangements 
and the responsibilities of parents and children toward one-another. Although the full force of 
these traditions is likely to be eroded with duration in the receiving country, immigrant groups 
that are very different from long term residents in language, religion, and normative values are 
likely to acculturate slowly (Breton, 1964).  
In this section, we examine the Muslim versus non-Muslim divide among migrants to 
France because this division represents a deep cleavage in French society and elsewhere in Europe. 
Some evidence of the force of this distinction for parental transmissions is apparent in the 
descriptive information of Table 3. From the entries in columns (2) and (3), it is evident that there 
are rather considerable differences among the communities in reasons for providing assistance to 
children. Whereas 35% of non-Muslim parents emphasize the financial need of children, the entry 
for Muslims is more than twice this figure. In part, the disparity might reflect the differential 
financial needs of children in the two communities, or differences in economic resources among 
the migrants, matters that we explore in this section. 
To make evident the dimensions of the cultural differences, we report in Table 4, panels B 
and C, the differential tendency toward equal allocation on the part of the two migrant 
communities. Overall, the rate of assistance to children is twice as high among non-Muslims (21% 
versus 10%, see total figures in column (2)), but this might also be due to the lesser resources of 
Muslim parents. More compelling is the huge disparity between the communities in tendency 
toward equal allocation, 10.4% among non-Muslims, 1.5% among Muslims (column 4). This 
proclivity is summarized in column (5) which reports the ratio of unequal to equal allocations, 
revealing a massive difference between the groups. Further, a Probit model for unequal versus 
equal sharing which uses parents as observations (column 6 of Table 5), makes clear that controls 
for parental resources do not eliminate the tendency toward unequal sharing in the Muslim 
population. Indeed, there is little indication that the level of parental resources, as measured by 
income or wealth (homeownership), influences the parental decision, though there is a small 
tendency toward equal allocation among better educated respondents. 
With this motivation for examining cultural effects, we turn to a more detailed 
examination of the allocation process. Probit estimates for the probability of a transfer receipt, by 
religious community, are reported in columns (1) and (4) of Table 6. What is apparent is the 
much greater responsiveness by non-Muslims to the parental characteristics, as measured by the 
magnitude of the coefficients. For this religious/cultural group transfer receipt reflects parental age, 
peaking at 61 years, education, and household income (see Figure 1). These variables have less 
impact on decision making among Muslim parents. Also, the numbers of children at home and 
the number outside the home--measures of competition for parental resources that are significant 
for both communities--show greater effects for non-Muslims. With respect to the number of 
children at home, the marginal effect is almost ten times as large among non-Muslims than among 
Muslims: an additional child reduces the receipt probability by 3.7 and 0.38 percentage points, 
respectively. 
Table 6 and Figure 1 about here 
With one notable exception, the consequences of the children’s characteristics for receipt of 
a transfer are less dramatic. In both communities the less well off child is more prone to obtain 
assistance; similarly, in both, the likelihood of a transfer receipt is greater for a child residing 
outside France, though the effect is considerably larger for Muslim migrants. What is distinctly 
different, however, is the role of gender in the two communities. A Muslim daughter has a receipt 
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probability that is around 40% of a son’s value (estimated at the means of the explanatory 
variables); among non-Muslims there is no gender difference.  
We suggest that the gender effect is a cultural artifact. As remarked earlier, in note 2, it is 
prescriptive in Muslim societies to provide smaller bequests to daughters; this norm may well 
influence inter vivos transfers as well. Further, in clan organized societies such as the Arab and 
North African countries, parents often see their adult daughters as belonging to the husband’s 
family upon marriage, and may consider them to have a lesser claim on the resources of the birth 
parents (Jowett 1991). 
To pursue the matter of the robustness of the estimates in the context of unobserved 
parental characteristics, we report in columns (2) and (5) the results from a fixed effects Logit 
model. For reasons discussed earlier, these regressions are restricted to the subsample of children 
from sibships of size two to four. The results are similar to those from the random effects models. 
In both communities there is a tendency to provide more support to a needy child, to prefer the 
child who does not live in France or who resides at a greater distance from the parental home. The 
most noteworthy difference is that with the fixed effects model we find a lower rate of transfer 
receipt by daughters of non-Muslim migrants relative to the sons, though the gender disparity is 
much greater in the Muslim community. In the former, the preference for sons translates into a 
receipt rate for daughters that is 69% of the son's rate, whereas, among Muslims, the 
corresponding figure is 36%. 
In regard to transfer amount, the findings parallel the results for the incidence analysis 
(Tobit model, columns (3) and (6) of Table 6). With respect the parental characteristics, one 
difference is that, among non-Muslims, we find a stronger effect of financial resources, in that 
home ownership (an indicator of equity) is now significant. With respect to the child's 
characteristics, two matters stand out. First, there is a reversal between the Muslim and non-
Muslim groups with respect to the importance of the parent's and child's characteristics, as judged 
by the magnitudes of the coefficients. The parental terms have larger effects among non-Muslims 
whereas the child's characteristics exhibit greater impacts among Muslims. Second, in contrast 
with the (fixed effects) incidence analysis, there now is no evidence of a disadvantage for daughters 
among non-Muslims, while their disadvantage in the Muslim community remains substantial. 
 To summarize, parental characteristics and especially the financial resources of parents 
appear to be less relevant to transfer decisions by Muslim migrants. In the main, the pattern of 
transfers by this group reflects measures of their children’s financial need, rather than differences in 
the availability of parental resources. This can be interpreted as suggesting a more calculative 
approach by Muslim parents in making transmittal decisions. Funds in some amount are routinely 
provided when required by a child, irrespective of the parents’ financial circumstance. The data in 
Table 3 are consistent with this assessment: Muslim parents provide assistance “because of 
financial need” at a rate that is twice the figure for non-Muslims. At the same time, as befits 
parents who often are poor, the amounts provided tend to be quite small (compare columns 2 and 
3 of Table 3). The second distinctive difference between the religious/cultural groups relates to the 
children’s characteristics. While parents from both communities are responsive to the financial 
needs of their children, daughters are singled out by Muslim parents for substantially fewer 
transfers and lesser amounts. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
The objectives of this paper were twofold: to compare the contrasting motives for parental 
transfers, altruism versus exchange, in a population of migrants to France, and investigate the role 
of cultural values, centered upon family relations and deriving from religious beliefs, on 
intergenerational transfer decisions. In the full population sample the results of our analysis 
provide support for the altruism thesis, in that the more needy children in a family have a higher 
probability of receiving assistance and, more critically, transfers do not diminish with distance 
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from the parental home. To the contrary, children living far from their parents or residing in the 
origin country appear to have a higher incidence of receipt and acquire greater sums. 
When we separate the migrants by religion, a rough proxy for cultural background, we find 
support for an altruistic motive in each of the groups. In both there is a greater likelihood of 
assistance being received by needy children, and in both the critical test variable, distance from the 
parental home, continues to refute an argument that children who live in proximity to their 
parents are more likely to receive assistance. The last finding detracts from an exchange motive 
account, which would tie transfer receipts to services provided to parents, as this would suggest 
greater assistance given to children who live close to the parental residence. Our empirical results 
therefore differ from Arrondel and Laferrere (2001) and Wolff (2000), who report larger transfers 
to financially better-off children, though they are consistent with McGarry and Schoeni (1995, 
1997) and Dunn and Phillips (1997). Beyond these findings we note rather distinctive cultural 
effects that influence transfer behavior, i.e. the lesser importance of parental resources in the 
decision process of Muslim migrants, the larger tendency in this community to differentiate 
among children and, as part of this calculation, the tendency to favor sons over daughters in the 
allocation decision. 
 We hasten to point out that while our results favor altruism over exchange as the dominant 
parental motive, our data do not permit a test of the neutrality property of the altruistic model, as 
in Altonji et al (1997).21 Also, there are some exchange models that cannot be tested with the sort 
of data available to us, such as ones that postulates (or postulate ??) a lag between the financial 
assistance provided to children and the services required by parents. Thus, if the migrants intend 
to return to their origin countries in retirement (as some do) and plan to reside nearby the children 
currently living there, or if the respondents calculate that there is a greater likelihood of receiving 
services in the future from less well off children because their time costs are lower, these kinds of 
exchange models cannot by rejected by our findings. What we can say is that our results do not 
support models of contemporaneous reciprocity between parents and children as guiding parental 
transfer decisions. 
 As a final matter, we return to the importance of culture in assessing parental motives. 
While our conclusion from this study, based principally on the analysis of receipts by the several 
children in a parental household, is that a single parental motive (altruism in that case) 
characterizes the transfer behavior of both Muslim and non-Muslim parents, this should not be 
assumed to hold true across societies. There is prima facia evidence, for example, that in less 
developed countries children are valued for the services they can bring to the parental home and, 
indeed, even conceived with such ends in mind (De Voss, 1985).  
One reason why sibships are large in less developed countries is that children are necessary 
to help farm the land, bring income to the household, and otherwise assist with the maintenance 
of a small family enterprise (Clay and Johnson, 1992). In the same vein, in these countries, 
children are often regarded by parents as representing assurances that they will be cared for in their 
later years (Jowett, 1991, Lillard and Willis, 1997). Such expectations are even articulated by 
parents, so it would not be surprising if these considerations were to enter into their calculations 





                                                 
21 Under an altruistic motive, a euro increase in parental income together with a euro decline in a child’s income 
should be offset by the transfer of one euro from the parent to the child. As shown in Wolff (2000), this property is 
strongly rejected in France. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample, by religion 
 




(1)       
No gift 
(2)     
Gift1 
     (3) 
     All 
(4)       
No gift 
 
(5)    
Gift1 
 
(6)      All
 
 
   (7)  
  All 
Financial transfers:        
    Receipt of transfer 0.000 1.000 0.129 0.000 1.000 0.043 0.092 
 
Characteristics of the parent:     
   
    Age 58.547 58.337 58.519 57.492 57.858 57.508 58.085 
    Lives with partner 0.827 0.858 0.831 0.841 0.810 0.840 0.835 
    Number of children at home 0.955 0.453 0.890 2.493 1.735 2.460 1.564 
    Number of children outside home 2.484 2.275 2.457 3.425 3.470 3.427 2.874 
    Years of education 7.881 10.095 8.168 3.432 4.419 3.474 6.152 
    Health problems 0.307 0.278 0.303 0.379 0.360 0.378 0.336 
    Currently working 0.394 0.449 0.401 0.277 0.324 0.279 0.348 
    Household’s income (log) 9.701 10.032 9.744 9.446 9.510 9.449 9.617 
    Home owner 0.604 0.726 0.620 0.279 0.281 0.279 0.474 
    Duration since migration (/100) 0.349 0.359 0.350 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.339 
    French citizenship 0.406 0.497 0.418 0.169 0.198 0.170 0.312 
    Difficulties in reading French 0.398 0.229 0.376 0.669 0.636 0.668 0.501 
     Origin country:        
    Northern Europe 0.078 0.190 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 
    Southern Europe 0.611 0.528 0.600 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.343 
    Eastern Europe 0.050 0.062 0.052 0.005 0.020 0.005 0.032 
    Northern Africa 0.089 0.102 0.091 0.878 0.810 0.875 0.428 
    Central and Southern Africa 0.059 0.026 0.055 0.031 0.036 0.031 0.045 
    America 0.018 0.031 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 
    Middle East 0.019 0.014 0.018 0.081 0.130 0.083 0.046 
    Asia 0.076 0.047 0.073 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.043 
     Religion:        
    Catholic 0.702 0.695 0.701 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 
    Muslim 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.429 
    Protestant 0.045 0.078 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 
    Other Christian 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 
    Other religion 0.109 0.099 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 
    No religion 0.089 0.071 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 
 
Characteristics of the child:  
       
    Female 0.488 0.491 0.488 0.500 0.391 0.495 0.491 
    Age 30.928 30.956 30.932 28.661 30.111 28.723 29.983 
    Lives with partner 0.567 0.617 0.574 0.444 0.478 0.445 0.519 
    Number of children 0.866 0.809 0.858 0.806 1.166 0.821 0.842 
    Years of education 11.756 13.197 11.943 9.569 7.763 9.492 10.890 
    Occupation: Working 0.731 0.735 0.731 0.541 0.395 0.535 0.647 
  Student 0.102 0.121 0.105 0.135 0.119 0.134 0.117 
  Unemployed 0.070 0.058 0.069 0.140 0.170 0.141 0.100 
  Inactive 0.097 0.086 0.095 0.184 0.316 0.190 0.136 
    Financial status:    Rich 0.348 0.334 0.346 0.208 0.111 0.204 0.285 
      Fair 0.524 0.476 0.518 0.579 0.447 0.574 0.542 
      Poor 0.127 0.190 0.136 0.212 0.443 0.222 0.173 
    Distance:  In France, at home 0.255 0.115 0.237 0.364 0.162 0.355 0.287 
  In France, less than 10 kms 0.303 0.283 0.301 0.272 0.206 0.269 0.287 
  In France, more than 10 kms 0.350 0.427 0.360 0.240 0.162 0.237 0.307 
  Does not live in France 0.092 0.174 0.103 0.124 0.470 0.139 0.118 
 
Number of observations 6836 1016 7852 5657 253 5910 13762 
 Source: Survey PRI 2003. 





Table 2. Receipt of financial transfers, by parent’s origin country and religion1 
 
 














% of receipt by 
a child Category 
midpoint Simulated 
Origin country:      
    Europe 5881 2559 13.6 3208 3107 
 Northern Europe 723 318 26.7 3047 2853 
 Southern Europe 4720 2025 11.4 3389 3310 
 Eastern Europe 438 216 15.5 2238 2228 
    Africa 6500 1939 5.3 1889 1749 
 Northern Africa 5884 1681 5.3 1944 1806 
 Central and Southern Africa 616 258 5.7 1397 1243 
    America 152 69 21.1 2028 1949 
    Middle-East 638 197 7.4 1709 1714 
    Asia 591 235 8.3 2227 1941 
Religion:      
    Non-Muslim 7852 3359 12.9 3120 3002 
 Catholic 5505 2364 12.8 3210 3101 
 Protestant 386 160 20.5 2965 2779 
 Other Christian 437 212 13.3 2227 2171 
 Other 847 351 11.9 2810 2787 
 No religion 677 272 10.6 3570 3240 
    Muslim 5910 1640 4.3 1147 1053 
Total 13762 4999 9.2 2727 2613 
Source: Survey PRI 2003. 










































Reason for making transfer 
% giving Amount % giving Amount % giving Amount 
Help because of financial need 42.9 1555 73.1 905 35.4 1890 
Help to buy a dwelling 13.8 7575 6.3 2865 15.6 8050 
Help for other non-housing expenditures 6.9 2145 2.4 1540 8.0 2190 
“Happy” family event 8.6 1135 3.6 770 9.8 1170 
Help for schooling expenditures 6.9 3080 4.0 2420 7.6 3165 
To make a gift 15.9 1180 7.5 1205 18.0 1175 
Other 5.0 7510 3.2 1980 5.5 8300 
Total 100.0 2735 100.0 1155 100.0 3130 
Source: Survey PRI 2003. 






















































Table 4. Occurrence of unequal and equal sharing 
 
A. All 








One child at 







1 1164 87.2 - 12.8 - 
2 1601 81.4 7.7 10.8 0.71 
3 989 82.1 11.9 6.0 1.98 
4 559 85.2 12.0 2.9 4.14 
More than 2 3149 82.3 9.8 7.9 1.24 
    
B. Muslim 




No recipient 0ne recipient at 
least, but not all
All recipient (3)/(4) 
1 253 93.7 - 6.3 - 
2 329 91.8 5.5 2.7 2.04 
3 304 88.5 10.5 1.0 10.50 
4 274 89.4 9.9 0.7 14.14 
More than 2 907 90.0 8.5 1.5 5.67 
    
C. Non Muslim 




No recipient 0ne recipient at 
least, but not all
All recipient (3)/(4) 
1 911 85.4 - 14.6 - 
2 1272 78.8 8.3 12.9 0.64 
3 685 79.3 12.6 8.2 1.54 
4 285 81.1 14.0 4.9 2.86 
More than 2 2242 79.2 10.3 10.4 0.99 
Source: Survey PRI 2003. 



























Table 5. Estimates for transfers received by children 
 Random effects Tobit 
Variables 
    (1) 
  Random 
effects Probit 
 
    (2)    
Conditional 
(Fixed effects) 
   Logit 
    (3) 
 Midpoint 
      
   (4) 
 Simulated 
 
   (5) 
  Interval  
 regression 
 
    (6) 
  Probit for 
unequal sharing 
    Constant -20.862***  -97.835*** -94.657*** -7.505*** -4.916 
 (5.58)  (5.58) (5.79) (5.11) (1.05) 
Characteristics of the parent :       
    Age 0.479***  2.176*** 2.109*** 0.194*** 0.169 
 (3.71)  (3.57) (3.71) (3.78) (1.06) 
    Age squared (10e-2) -0.415***  -1.900*** -1.831*** -0.164*** -0.140 
 (3.70)  (3.59) (3.72) (3.67) (1.03) 
    Lives with partner -0.005  -0.200 -0.232 0.045 -0.254 
 (0.04)  (0.30) (0.37) (0.80) (1.42) 
    Number of children at home -0.311***  -1.486*** -1.332*** -0.087*** 0.624*** 
 (6.29)  (6.38) (5.70) (7.53) (6.45) 
    Number of children outside home -0.159***  -0.750*** -0.756*** -0.084*** 0.401*** 
 (5.36)  (5.49) (5.76) (7.44) (5.01) 
    Years of education 0.049***  0.211*** 0.196*** 0.029*** -0.031** 
 (4.11)  (3.74) (3.75) (4.45) (2.25) 
    Health problems 0.062  0.288 0.270 -0.039 0.021 
 (0.58)  (0.56) (0.56) (0.88) (0.16) 
    Currently working 0.017  0.052 0.043 -0.022 -0.088 
 (0.14)  (0.10) (0.08) (0.39) (0.63) 
    Household’s income (log) 0.288***  1.556*** 1.526*** 0.176*** -0.048 
 (4.57)  (5.21) (5.28) (6.62) (0.56) 
    Home owner 0.251**  1.328** 1.270** 0.132*** 0.107 
 (2.22)  (2.41) (2.46) (2.95) (0.72) 
    Duration since migration 1.135**  5.762*** 5.111** 0.314 -0.718 
 (2.20)  (2.70) (2.47) (1.12) (1.26) 
    French citizenship 0.025  0.391 0.471 0.060 -0.042 
 (0.22)  (0.77) (0.96) (1.11) (0.33) 
    Difficulties in reading French -0.410***  -2.089*** -1.930*** -0.122*** -0.055 
 (3.24)  (3.51) (3.49) (2.66) (0.35) 
    Muslim -0.248*  -1.336** -1.437** -0.082* 0.516** 
 (1.70)  (1.98) (2.19) (1.82) (2.48) 
Characteristics of the child :        
    Female -0.249*** -0.617*** -1.098*** -1.042*** -0.046  
 (3.92) (4.35) (3.82) (3.80) (1.37)  
    Age 0.033 -0.037 0.147 0.129 0.010  
 (0.74) (0.39) (0.71) (0.66) (0.52)  
    Age squared (10e-2) -0.044 0.076 -0.211 -0.193 -0.014  
 (0.67) (0.53) (0.67) (0.64) (0.49)  
    Lives with partner -0.102 -0.129 -0.490 -0.415 0.009  
 (1.23) (0.70) (1.32) (1.17) (0.19)  
    Number of children 0.016 0.022 0.016 0.011 -0.011  
 (0.49) (0.35) (0.10) (0.08) (0.65)  
    Years of education 0.006 0.009 0.035 0.035 0.007**  
 (0.75) (0.55) (0.96) (1.01) (2.05)  
    Occupation: Student 0.575*** 1.015*** 2.614*** 2.547*** 0.306***  
    (ref: Working) (4.57) (3.67) (4.63) (4.75) (4.56)  
  Unemployed 0.211* 0.329 1.052* 1.025* 0.048  
 (1.79) (1.31) (1.92) (1.95) (0.93)  
  Inactive 0.238** 0.488** 1.236*** 1.137** 0.020  
 (2.39) (2.42) (2.63) (2.52) (0.36)  
    Financial status:     Fair 0.228*** 0.543*** 1.063*** 1.030*** 0.099**  
    (ref: Rich) (2.75) (2.75) (2.82) (2.87) (2.24)  
      Poor 1.018*** 1.640*** 4.797*** 4.655*** 0.506***  
 (9.46) (6.92) (9.84) (9.99) (7.75)  
    Distance:     In France, less than 10 kms 0.727*** 0.928*** 3.457*** 3.310*** 0.401***  
    (ref: In France, at home) (5.97) (3.56) (6.11) (6.15) (7.03)  
          In France, more than 10 kms 0.875*** 1.055*** 4.077*** 3.924*** 0.498***  
 (7.40) (4.24) (7.48) (7.56) (8.70)  
          Does not live in France 1.620*** 1.960*** 7.456*** 7.158*** 0.972***  
 (11.49) (6.51) (11.45) (11.48) (11.12)  
Number of observations 13762 1449 13762 13762 13762 557 
Number of families 4999 401 4999 4999 4999 557 
Log likelihood -3019.3 -441.5 -6557.6 -6487.8 -27670.0 -325.6 
  Source: Survey PRI 2003. 
  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant levels are respectively 1%(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
                  Table 6. Estimates for transfers received by children, by religion 




















    Constant -30.710***  -97.117*** -3.592  -25.947 
 (5.76)  (5.43) (0.78)  (0.84) 
Characteristics of the parent :       
    Age 0.777***  2.216*** -0.057  -0.320 
 (4.36)  (3.57) (0.36)  (0.30) 
    Age squared (10e-2) -0.678***  -1.913*** 0.049  0.275 
 (4.39)  (3.58) (0.35)  (0.30) 
    Lives with partner 0.068  0.052 -0.005  0.182 
 (0.30)  (0.08) (0.03)  (0.16) 
    Number of children at home -0.619***  -2.167*** -0.105**  -0.712** 
 (5.69)  (8.16) (2.46)  (2.53) 
    Number of children outside home -0.159***  -0.551*** -0.134***  -0.859*** 
 (4.25)  (4.06) (3.46)  (3.34) 
    Years of education 0.063***  0.138*** 0.047***  0.302*** 
 (4.00)  (2.73) (2.62)  (2.59) 
    Health problems 0.077  0.033 0.085  0.583 
 (0.50)  (0.06) (0.61)  (0.63) 
    Currently working -0.064  -0.304 0.028  0.450 
 (0.37)  (0.54) (0.17)  (0.43) 
    Household’s income (log) 0.381***  1.643*** 0.144*  0.966* 
 (4.64)  (5.88) (1.80)  (1.83) 
    Home owner 0.256  1.403*** 0.161  1.137 
 (1.37)  (2.59) (1.05)  (1.11) 
    Duration since migration 0.662  3.226 0.855  5.620 
 (1.00)  (1.55) (1.02)  (1.03) 
    French citizenship -0.071  -0.051 0.192  1.491 
 (0.46)  (0.11) (1.07)  (1.23) 
    Difficulties in reading French -0.876***  -3.151*** 0.108  0.583 
 (4.73)  (5.52) (0.69)  (0.56) 
Characteristics of the child :        
    Female -0.120 -0.364** -0.373 -0.496*** -1.028*** -3.319*** 
 (1.44) (2.02) (1.30) (4.45) (4.12) (4.58) 
    Age 0.054 0.022 0.210 -0.009 -0.024 -0.082 
 (0.84) (0.17) (0.94) (0.14) (0.16) (0.20) 
    Age squared (10e-2) -0.086 -0.039 -0.399 0.025 0.063 0.167 
 (0.88) (0.20) (1.17) (0.25) (0.28) (0.26) 
    Lives with partner -0.113 -0.144 -0.288 -0.138 -0.050 -1.032 
 (1.01) (0.59) (0.77) (1.03) (0.16) (1.17) 
    Number of children -0.015 -0.062 -0.131 0.050 0.041 0.356 
 (0.29) (0.56) (0.73) (1.20) (0.49) (1.30) 
    Years of education 0.017 0.022 0.043 -0.005 -0.004 -0.021 
 (1.51) (0.90) (1.13) (0.45) (0.16) (0.32) 
    Occupation: Student 0.606*** 1.008*** 2.547*** 0.509*** 1.083** 3.244*** 
    (ref: Working) (3.51) (2.71) (4.33) (2.76) (2.51) (2.72) 
  Unemployed -0.023 -0.103 0.309 0.265* 0.339 1.683* 
 (0.12) (0.25) (0.48) (1.74) (0.95) (1.68) 
  Inactive 0.350** 0.767*** 1.352*** 0.176 0.241 0.955 
 (2.47) (2.76) (2.64) (1.23) (0.74) (1.02) 
    Financial status:     Fair 0.226** 0.367 0.734** 0.383** 1.064** 2.383** 
    (ref: Rich) (2.13) (1.58) (2.07) (2.27) (2.44) (2.19) 
      Poor 1.096*** 1.545*** 3.885*** 0.993*** 1.994*** 6.538*** 
 (7.66) (5.17) (7.96) (5.26) (4.25) (5.33) 
    Distance:        In France, less than 10 kms 0.773*** 1.105*** 3.016*** 0.649*** 0.687 4.408*** 
    (ref: In France, at home) (4.49) (3.24) (5.14) (3.54) (1.59) (3.60) 
              In France, more than 10 kms 0.952*** 1.249*** 3.470*** 0.652*** 0.782* 4.321*** 
 (5.79) (3.81) (6.08) (3.57) (1.86) (3.57) 
          Does not live in France 1.258*** 1.398*** 4.626*** 1.942*** 3.071*** 13.031*** 
 (6.01) (3.70) (6.79) (9.07) (5.53) (9.04) 
Number of observations 7852 790 7852 5910 659 5910 
Number of families 3359 258 3359 1640 143 1640 
Log likelihood -2148.6 -250.0 -4925.6 -795.9 -175.1 -1474.5 
 Source: Survey PRI 2003. 
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